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Protecting Children in Nontraditional Families:
Second Parent Adoptions in Washington*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most adults take for granted their right, through marriage
and adoption, to legally protect their relationship with chil-
dren. A substantial segment of adults, however, cannot take
this right for granted. In some states these individuals are
denied the right to have a legal relationship with their part-
ners' children because they are lesbians.'
This proscription denies children whose parents are in a
committed lesbian relationship the same legal and psychologi-
cal protections found in legally recognized families. Yet, all
children, regardless of their parents' sexual orientation, have a
need for stability and predictability.2 Children already living
in a household with two established parental figures-one nat-
ural, the other nonbirth-have an interest in securing the
same rights other children are afforded, namely: inheritance
rights; child support, if the parents separate; benefits accruing
from social security, pension plans, and health insurance; and
continuity of relationship with both parents.
* The author would like to thank Raven Lidman, Clinical Professor of Law,
University of Puget Sound, for her generous advice and assistance.
1. New Hampshire is an example of one of these states. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 170-B:4 (1987). See also infra note 89.
2. McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 310, 738 P.2d 254, 261 (1987). The
Washington Supreme Court, in McDaniels, recognized that child experts have
determined that stability and predictability in a parent child relationship are
important factors in the child's development. The importance of stability and
predictability overrides the existence of the additional factor that one of the child's
parents is not biologically related. Id. See generally In re Aschauer, 93 Wash. 2d 689,
695 n.5, 611 P.2d 1245, 1249 n.5 (1980); In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App. 637, 648,
626 P.2d 16, 23 (1981); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979); E. ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1963); Watson,
The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 55 (1969-70); Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes
Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963).
3. See generally infra note 4.
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The rights and needs of children in these nontraditional
families could be recognized through second parent adoptions.4
In essence, a second parent adoption is the adoption of a child
by the partner of the child's natural or legal parent. For exam-
ple, suppose a lesbian couple, Emily and Lynn, decide to have a
child. Emily conceives the child through artificial insemina-
tion. Lynn, the nonbirth parent, then petitions the court to
adopt Emily's child and the court grants this adoption without
terminating Emily's parental rights. The child then has two
legal parents through the second parent adoption process.
In 1988 and 1989, three Washington courts joined the
courts of three other states in granting second parent adop-
tions.5 This Comment examines the issue of second parent
adoptions in Washington and concludes that they do not con-
travene established legal principles. First, Part A describes the
second parent adoptions granted in Washington and other
states. Part A also shows that second parent adoptions are
legally necessary. Second, Part B examines the Washington
adoption statute6 and determines that it is permissive of second
parent adoptions. Finally, Part C evaluates whether second
parent adoptions satisfy the legislative requirement of provid-
ing for the best interests of the child.7 This Comment con-
cludes that, all other variables being equal,8 second parent
adoptions do not contravene the legislative intent.
To avoid the difficulties and issues involved with the exist-
ence of a known other legal parent, this Comment presumes
that the natural mother is unmarried and was artificially
inseminated by an unknown donor.9 This Comment also
4. Second parent adoption is a new term that was first introduced in the literature
by Zuckerman, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families: Legal
Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729 (1986). See also Patt,
Second Parent Adoption: When Crossing the Marital Barrier is in a Child's Best
Interests, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 96 (1987).
5. See In re Child 1 and Child 2, No. 89-5-00067-7 (Thurston County Super. Ct.
Nov. 16, 1989); In re the Interest of E.B.G., No. 87-5-00137-5 (Thurston County Super.
Ct. Mar. 29, 1989); In re Adoption of (Child A and Child B), No. 88-5-00088-9 (Spokane
County Super. Ct. June 23, 1988).
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.010-.901 (1989).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.010 (1989).
8. In a proposed second parent adoption, any person can request that a
preplacement investigation be conducted by a local adoption agency to evaluate all
variables conducive to raising the child, for example, a child's exposure to adult males,
family income, etc. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
9. Washington's artificial insemination statute provides:
(1) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man
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presumes that the petition for adoption is not for a joint adop-
tion, but it is a petition for adoption of a child already living in
the particular household. Additionally, this Comment refers
almost exclusively to lesbian mothers, but the same analysis
should apply to situations involving gay fathers as well as
unmarried heterosexual parents.
A. Second Parent Adoptions Have Been Granted in
Washington and Other States
Second parent adoptions resemble stepparent adoptions,
with the exception of the element of marriage.1 ° They are
most applicable to situations in which the adults, desiring to
share parenting responsibilities, are unwilling or unable to
marry.11
In stepparent adoptions, the rights of the natural custodial
parent are not terminated; the natural custodial parent merely
consents to the adoption by his or her spouse. A stepparent
adoption, however, does terminate the legal relationship
between the non-custodial natural parent and the child. In
Washington1 2 and in other states, the general rule is that natu-
ral non-custodial parental rights are terminated when an adop-
tion is granted; however, when a stepparent adopts the child of
his or her spouse an exception to this rule applies and the
rights of the natural custodial parent remain intact.13
Second parent adoptions, like stepparent adoptions, do not
require the natural mother to relinquish her parental rights
and responsibilities; rather, they permit the nonbirth parent to
assume parental rights and responsibilities in conjunction with
the natural parent.'4 Thus, through second parent adoption, it
is possible for a child and a lesbian nonbirth parent to obtain
not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural
father of a child thereby conceived .... (2) The donor of semen provided to a
licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the
donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child
thereby conceived unless the donor and the woman agree in writing that said
donor shall be the father.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1989) (emphasis added).
10. Patt, supra note 4, at 118; Zuckerman, supra note 4, at 729.
11. Patt, supra note 4, at 96.
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.150(4) (1989). It is implicit in the statute and case
law that by joining in the petition for a stepparent adoption, the natural custodial
parents' rights are not terminated. See also In re Gargan, 21 Wash. App. 423, 587 P.2d
545 (1981).
13. See In re Jessica W., 122 N.H. 1052, 453 A.2d 1297 (1982).
14. See sources cited supra note 4.
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the protection of a relationship sanctioned by the law if the
nonbirth parent is permitted to adopt the child through a sec-
ond parent adoption.15 In addition to providing children with
basic economic protection, allowing a nonbirth parent to adopt
ensures that the adoptive parent has the authority to deal with
schools, doctors, and other agencies.16 Furthermore, the rights
of both the nonbirth parent and the child would be protected
15. Id. If a court denies a lesbian nonbirth parent the opportunity to adopt merely
because of her sexual orientation, it opens the door for the argument that its decision
has violated the Washington privileges and immunities clause. WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 12 (1889).
Justice Utter of the Washington Supreme Court argues that Washington is not
bound by the limits imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretations of various
civil rights, and Washington can grant more rights than the federal fourteenth
amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Utter, Independent Interpretation of the
Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 499 (1984);
Washington has specifically accepted this responsibility. Id. at 493, 499, citing State v.
Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (Washington Supreme Court conferring
more limitations in searches and seizures under article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution than under the federal Constitution, citing Alderwood Assocs. v.
Environmental Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) (Washington Supreme
Court conferring more protection for freedom of speech under article II, section 7 of
the Washington Constitution than under the federal Constitution)); Darrin v. Gould,
85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975) (holding that the state privileges and immunities
clause may be construed to provide greater protection to individual rights than that
afforded by the United States Constitution's fourteenth amendment); see also Bowman
v. Waldt, 9 Wash. App. 562, 513 P.2d 559 (1973) (holding that rulings by the U.S.
Supreme Court construing the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution are not binding on state courts construing similar language of article I,
section 12 of the Washington Constitution).
But see Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 85 Wash. 2d 348, 535 P.2d 804 (1975)
(where a gay teacher was fired from his job because he claimed to be a homosexual,
and the court found, under the direction of a now repealed sodomy statute, that a
claim of homosexuality was equivalent to stating one had engaged in sodomy, and
therefore, that one had engaged in illegal activity; the Gaylord court did not consider a
privileges and immunities argument); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187
(1974) (where the court did discuss fourteenth amendment equal protection in the
context of two gay men seeking to marry each other and concluded that a statute that
distinguishes between certain classes of persons is generally presumed to be
constitutional and will be upheld if it rests upon some reasonable and rational basis;
only classifications that are "inherently suspect" must meet the test of "compelling
state interest").
While the Singer court determined that homosexuals are not a suspect class, it did
not analyze all of the necessary steps to finding a particular class suspect. Id. at 261-62,
522 P.2d at 1195-96. The court merely stated that homosexuals are not suspect. The
court also determined that Washington does not recognize an intermediate level of
scrutiny. Id. at 262-63 n.13, 522 P.2d at 1196-97 n.13. Thus, under a rational basis test,
the Singer court reasoned that the couple could be denied the right to marry because
marriage is defined as the union between a man and a woman. The legislative intent
was to protect the institution of marriage and its procreative aspect. Id. at 259, 522
P.2d at 1195.
16. Zuckerman, supra note 4, at 742.
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in the event the relationship between the nonbirth parent and
the natural parent dissolved.17
Gradually, several states-Alaska, California, Oregon, and
Washington-have begun to permit second parent adoptions
using the same principles and legal processes involved in step-
parent adoptions."8 The Washington courts have authorized
three second parent adoptions.'9 In In re the Interest of E.B.G.,
the natural and nonbirth parents were successful in their
efforts to obtain approval of a second parent adoption despite
opposition by the guardian ad litem.2 °
In Alaska, a superior court judge granted a second parent
adoption by a lesbian mother's partner.2' The parental rights
of the natural mother were not severed and the mother's les-
bian partner was permitted to be a legally-recognized second
parent.22 In Oregon, a natural mother, who gave birth after
being artificially inseminated, and her partner desired to have
the child adopted by the nonbirth parent.23 The child had been
17. Id.; see also Patt, supra note 4, at 106.
18. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
19. See cases cited supra note 19.
20. Report of Guardian ad Litem, In re the Interest of E.B.G., No. 87-5-00137-5
(Thurston County Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1989) (the only Washington second parent
adoption that has been contested) [hereinafter Report of Guardian ad Litem]; see also
In re the Interest of E.B.G., No. 87-5-001137-5 (Thurston County Super. Ct. Mar. 29,
1989). But see In re Jason C., 129 N.H. 762, 533 A.2d 32 (1987) (New Hampshire does
not permit unmarried cohabitating adults to petition for joint adoption); Rich, Sexual
Orientation in the Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REV. 773, 782-3 (1988)
(citing appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 151 Ariz. 335, 727 P.2d 830
(1986) (noting the illegality of homosexual acts and upholding a decision denying a
bisexual the opportunity to adopt a child)).
21. In re Adoption of a Minor Child, No. 1-JU-86-73 PIA (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar.
3, 1987).
In the Alaska case, In Re Adoption of a Minor Child, the child's guardian ad
litem recommended that the adoption be granted to a lesbian couple who had
coparented the child since birth. The guardian ad litem's report specifically
acknowledged the lesbian relationship between the women, but refused to
give that relationship any weight in the best interest determination or to
discuss it further noting that: Except for the observations that [A] and [B] are
the two adults in the household of which [the child] is an integral part, that
[A] has accepted the role of the primary caretaker for [the child] and that the
household appears to have been successful and will likely continue to be
successful for all three, this report will not address the relationship between
[A] and [B]. Other than stated herein, the relationship does not directly affect
the child.
Patt, supra note 4, at 130 n.227 (citing Report of Guardian ad Litem, In re Adoption of
a Minor Child, No. 1-JU-86-73 PIA (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 1987)); see also In re
Adoption of A.O.L., No. 1-JU-85-25 (Alaska Super. Ct. July 23, 1985).
22. In re Adoption of a Minor Child, No. 1-JU-86-73 PIA.
23. See In re Adoption of M.M.S.A., No. D-8503-61930 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multinomah
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parented by both adults since birth.24 The Oregon court per-
mitted the adoption without severing the natural mother's
rights and responsibilities. 25 California has also permitted four
second parent adoptions, two by lesbian partners26 and two by
unmarried heterosexual partners.
27
In each of the states that have granted second parent adop-
tions, the paramount factor underlying the decisions has been
the same as in all adoption cases: the best interests of the
child.2s However, adoptions are a creature of statute, not com-
mon law. If a court determines that the statute is not permis-
sive of second parent adoptions, then it is unnecessary to reach
a consideration of the best interests of the child standard.29
Once it is determined that the statute is permissive of second
parent adoptions, the courts have discretionary power to grant
the adoption if it is in the child's best interests. It is the thesis
of this Comment that second parent adoptions can be granted
by all Washington courts reviewing such petitions.
1. Second Parent Adoptions Are Legally Necessary
A question which must be addressed before evaluating the
Washington adoption statute and the best interests of the child
standard is whether there is an alternative to adoption. In the
final analysis, adoption is the only real means to protect the
legal rights of both the child and the nonbirth parent.3 ° Other
County Sept. 4, 1985). In Oregon, the adoption statute provides that "[a]ny person may
petition . . . for leave to adopt[,]" OR. REV. STAT. § 109.310(1) (1985), although, an
adoptive parent must be twenty one years or older. OR. REV. STAT., § 109.425(4) (1983).
24. In re Adoption of M.M.S.A., No. D-8503-61930.
25. Id.
26. See In re Petition of Carol-Adopting Parent, No. 18364 (Cal. Super. Ct., City
and County of San Francisco Nov. 7, 1988); Adoption Petition of Nancy, Adopting
Parent, No. 18086 (Cal. Super. Ct., City and County of San Francisco Sept. 28, 1987).
27. See In re D.J.L., No. A-28345 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 1984); Patt, supra note 4,
at 98 (citing In re Adoptive Parent, No. A-10169 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 1986).
The California adoption statute provides that an adoptive parent shall be at least
10 years older than the unmarried prospective minor adoptee. CAL. CIV. CODE,
§ 222(a) (West 1982).
28. See In re L.A., 597 P.2d 513 (Alaska 1979); Adoption of Michelle Lee T., 44 Cal.
App. 3d 699, 117 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1975); In re Adoption of Sarkissian, 215 Cal. App. 2d
554, 30 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1963); In re D., 24 Or. App. 601, 547 P.2d 175, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 907 (1976). In Alaska and Washington the "best interests" test actually appears in
the adoption statute. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.120(c) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.010
(1986).
29. Patt, supra note 4, at 111.
30. Zuckerman, supra note 4, at 743 (describing an actual situation where the
maternal grandparents intervened eight years after the natural mother died, and were
[Vol. 13:321
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forms of protection such as legal wills, guardianship status, and
custody do not offer the same legal protections.
If a natural parent makes a legal will, and names the
nonbirth parent as the person she desires to parent her child
upon her death, the will could be contested.31 For example,
the natural parent's free will may be found invalid upon a
showing of undue influence, thereby defeating the appoint-
ment of a testamentary guardian.32 If the nonbirth parent died
testate leaving property to the child, the nonbirth parent's
heirs could also attempt to invalidate her legal will by showing
undue influence.3 If the nonbirth parent died intestate, the
child would not be considered "issue" for purposes of distribu-
tion under the Washington descent and distribution statute.34
The natural parent could identify the nonbirth parent as a
testamentary guardian before she dies. 3 However, guardian-
ship status is controlled by the court and may be denied or ter-
minated at any time.36 Appointment as a guardian also does
awarded custody of the child despite the fact that the child had lived with the nonbirth
parent for fourteen years); see also infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
31. But see Report of Guardian ad Litem, supra note 20 (suggesting, without
supporting authority, that courts would be unlikely to alter the intent of a will).
32. Undue influence, while difficult to prove, must be established by the persons
contesting a legal will. Influence is undue if it overcomes the free will of the testator
and replaces it with the will of the person exerting the influence. The testator must
remain a free agent when making a legal will. Circumstantial evidence of a
confidential relationship between the testator and the beneficiary is an important
factor in establishing undue influence. M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, WASHINGTON
LAW OF WILLS AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION 87, 92 (1985).
33. Id.
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015 (1989) (provides for the plan of distribution to
surviving spouses, issue, parents, brothers or sisters, grandparents, or aunts and uncles
of the decedant); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.005(4) (1989) ("issue includes all the lawful
lineal descendants of the ancestor and all lawfully adopted children").
35. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.080 (1989) which provides the following:
When either parent is deceased, the surviving parent of any minor child may,
by his last will in writing appoint a guardian or guardians . .. of his minor
child, whether born at the time of making such will or afterwards, to continue
during the minority of such child or for any less time, and every such
testamentary guardian of the estate of such child shall give bond in like
manner and with like conditions as required by WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.100
and 11.88.110, and he shall have the same powers and perform the same duties
with regard to the person and estate of the minor as a guardian appointed as
aforesaid.
See also Report of Guardian ad Litem, supra note 20 (suggesting that a legal will is
sufficient legal protection).
36. In re Guardianship of Adamec, 100 Wash. 2d 166, 175, 667 P.2d 1085, 1089-91
(1983) (the court's authority to appoint a guardian does not deprive the court of its
broad jurisdiction); In re Hallauer, 44 Wash. App. 795, 797, 723 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1986)
("guardianships are equitable creations of the courts and it is the court that retains
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not confer the right to custody of a child. 7
Finally, if the natural parent and the nonbirth parent
decide to separate, there is no established right for the
nonbirth parent to have custody or visitation privileges.38 By
statute, Washington permits "nonparents" to petition for child
custody.39 However, the standard for defeating a natural par-
ents' rights in a custody battle is very high.4 °
The limitations of legal wills, guardianship, and custody
suggest that the only method for completely protecting the
relationship between a child and its nonbirth parent is for the
Washington courts to permit second parent adoptions.
B. Second Parent Adoptions Are Authorized by Washington's
Adoption Statute
Thus far, this Comment has demonstrated that second par-
ent adoptions are similar to stepparent adoptions, and that
they are legally necessary to protect a child's relationship with
his or her nonbirth parent. This section evaluates the Wash-
ington adoption statute and concludes that second parent adop-
tions do not contravene the statutory language.
Adoptions authorized by statute are the legal means by
which persons who are unable to bear children, or who are
unmarried, or both, can create a legal relationship with chil-
ultimate responsibility for protecting the ward's person"); Seattle-First Nat. Bank v.
Bromers, 89 Wash. 2d 190, 200, 570 P.2d 1035, 1041 (1977) (guardians are considered
officers of the court and the court has jurisdiction over guardian and ward).
See also WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.020 (1989) (stating in part: "No person is
qualified to serve as a domiciliary guardian who is . . . a person the court finds
unsuitable."); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.010 (1989) (stating in part: "Guardians . . .
shall at all times be under the general direction and control of the court making the
appointment.").
37. In re Marshall, 46 Wash. App. 339, 343, 731 P.2d 5, 8 (1986).
38. Shapiro & Schultz, Single-Sex Families: The Impact of Birth Innovations
Upon Traditional Family Notions, 24 J. FAM. L. 271 (1985-86) (when the lesbian
parents separated, the nonbirth mother agreed to pay child support but had to petition
the court for visitation privileges; the court determined that she was entitled to
reasonable rights of visitation) (citing Loftin v. Flournoy, No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Sept. 4, 1984)).
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.010-.913 (1989).
40. In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App. 637, 648-49, 626 P.2d 16, 23 (1981); see
also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.190 (1986 and Supp. 1989) (providing in part that, "the
court shall retain the custodian . . . unless . . . the child's present environment is
detrimental to his or her physical, mental, or emotional health and the harm likely to
be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to
the child").
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dren.4 ' In Washington, adoptions are considered a "creature of
statute," which traditionally means the statute must be strictly
construed.42 Adoptions are also considered a privilege, not a
right, and the burden of establishing fitness as an adoptive par-
ent is on the petitioner.43
In 1984, the entire Washington adoption statute was
repealed and replaced by a revised statute.4 The legislative
history of the revised statute indicates that "a child's best
interests should be the foremost consideration in adoption pro-
ceedings. '4' The legislative intent provision in the statute indi-
cates that: "the purpose of adoption is to provide stable homes
for children .... The guiding principle must be determining
what is in the best interest of the child. '4 6 The term "best
interest" is not defined in the act.
The statute does require the appointment of someone
approved by the court to prepare pre- and post-placement
reports.47 The pre-placement report must contain information
concerning: "the fitness of the person requesting the report as
an adoptive parent[,] . . . the home environment, family life,
health, facilities, and the resources of the person requesting
the report .... "48 The post-placement report must contain
"[a]ll reasonably available information concerning the physical
and mental condition of the child, home environment, family
life, health, facilities and resources of the petitioners and any
other facts and circumstances relating to the propriety and
advisability of the adoption. ' 49 These three provisions suggest
that the adoption statute requires a particularized determina-
tion of best interest based upon the facts and circumstances of
the specific family before the court.
The adoption statute also specifically addresses situations
41. Comment, Best Interests of Children and the Interests of Adoptive Parents:
Isn't it Time for Comprehensive Reform?, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 749 (1989).
42. Id. at 755; see also In re Adoption of Henderson, 97 Wash. 2d 356, 644 P.2d 1178
(1982).
43. In re Infant Boy John Doe, 74 Wash. 2d 396, 403, 444 P.2d 800, 804 (1968); see
also infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
44. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.32.010-.916 was replaced with WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 26.33.010-.901.
45. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, MEMORANDUM ON H-2832/84-ADOPTION
REFORM, (Oct. 6, 1983) (H. Reinert, Counsel) [hereinafter ADOPTION REFORM].
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.010 (1989).
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.180-200(1) (1989).
48. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.220 (pre- and post-placement
investigation in stepparent adoption not required unless ordered by the court).
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.190(2) (1989).
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involving parents' voluntary relinquishment of children to a
state department, or agency, or to an adoptive parent or par-
ents, involuntary relinquishment of children and termination
of parental rights, and stepparent adoptions.5 0 More impor-
tantly, however, the statute neither affirmatively permits nor
prohibits second parent adoptions; the primary guiding princi-
ple is the given language and the legislative intent that the
"best interests of the child" be the determining factor.
1. Identifying Those Who May Adopt
The statute does contain one specific criterion, other than
the "best interests" standard, for determining whether to grant
an adoption. The specific criterion is the eligibility of the peti-
tioner to adopt.
In 1955, the Washington adoption statute specifically iden-
tified the classes of people who could adopt, namely an unmar-
ried person, a husband and wife, or a spouse in a stepparent
adoption.5 ' In 1984, the language identifying the classes of per-
sons who may adopt was changed to a generic "any person"
and an age and competency requirement was added. In partic-
ular, the current statute states in part: "Any person who is
legally competent and who is eighteen years of age or older
may be an adoptive parent."
5 2
Arguably, the change in language to "any competent per-
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.080 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.100 (1989).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.020 (1955) ("Any person not married, or any husband
and wife jointly, or either spouse, when the object of adoption is the child of the other
spouse may petition ... for leave to adopt.").
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.140 (1989). See In re Adoption of a Minor Child, No.
1-JU-86-73 PIA (Alaska Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 1987) for an example of an application of an
adoption statute containing more detailed definitions. Alaska specifically lists the
categories of persons who may adopt and yet it has permitted two second parent
adoptions.
Specifically, the Alaska law provides:
(a) The following persons may adopt:
(1) a husband and wife together;
(2) an unmarried adult;
(3) the unmarried father or mother of person to be adopted;
(4) a married person without the other spouse joining as a petitioner, if
the person to be adopted is not the other spouse, and if
(A) the other spouse is a parent of the person to be adopted and consents
to the adoption; or
(B) the petitioner and the other spouse are legally separated; or
(C) the failure of the other spouse to join in the petition or to agree to
the adoption is excused by the court ....
ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.020(a) (1983). See also sources cited supra note 21.
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son" does not affect a nonbirth parent's right to petition the
court to adopt. The statutory language of "who may adopt"
does not define the nature of families created by adoption, but
only the competency of the individuals seeking to adopt-com-
petency meaning that the petitioner is both "competent" and
at least "eighteen years of age.""
The above argument regarding competency and age is sim-
ilar to the argument rejected by the Washington Court of
Appeals in Singer v. Hara.' In Singer, two men seeking to
marry each other were denied a marriage license. The gay
couple argued that when the legislature changed the language
regarding who may contract to marry from "males of the age
twenty-one and females of the age eighteen" to "persons of the
age of eighteen years, who are otherwise capable," the legisla-
ture intended to remove the limitation permitting only males
and females to marry.55 The change to "persons otherwise
capable," they argued, meant that the legislature did not
intend to define the "competency of marriage but only the
competency of individuals seeking to marry."56 The appeals
court rejected this argument, stating that the legislative
changes merely intended to equalize the age requirements
between males and females and did not intend to permit two
persons of the same sex to marry.
The legislative changes in the marriage statute to "persons
otherwise capable" and the adoption statute to "any competent
person" are vastly different. In the marriage statute, the legis-
lature merely intended to equalize the previous age differ-
ences; once the ages were equalized, it became unnecessary to
distinguish between males and females. Consequently, the leg-
islature merely used the generic term "persons otherwise
capable."5 "
53. In re the Interest of E.B.G., No. 87-5-00137-5 (Thurston County Super. Ct. Mar.
29, 1989) Trial Brief of Co-Petitioners, [hereinafter Trial Brief].
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.140(2) (1989) does not define "competency." However,
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.010(1) (1989) defines an "incompetent" as "any person who is
... [u]nder the age of majority[,] . . . or [i]ncompetent by reason of mental illness,
developmental disability, senility, habitual drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, or
other mental incapacity, of either managing his property or caring for himself."
54. 11 Wash. App. 247, 249, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1974).
55. Id. at 249, 522 P.2d at 1189. This limitation appears at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.04.010 (1986).
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In contrast to the former marriage statute provision, the
former adoption statute provision identified who may adopt,
but did not use discriminatory language based on age or any
other factor. The provision originally used marital status as a
basis for determining which class of persons could adopt. In
the revised statute, the legislature reidentified this class as a
generic "any competent person" and added an age require-
ment. In essence, the two adoption provisions are the same
because, technically, all "competent persons" are either mar-
ried or unmarried. Therefore, the change neither broadened
nor narrowed the scope of who may adopt. A lesbian nonbirth
parent would be permitted to adopt under either provision
because she is technically "an unmarried person."
Another difference between the changes in the marriage
statute and the changes in the adoption statute was illustrated
by the Singer court's determination that other provisions of
the marriage statute continue to refer to "males" and
"females." Because of the continuing references in the mar-
riage statute to "males and females," the court concluded that
the legislature did not intend to authorize same sex marriage.59
In comparison, the adoption statute continues to refer to
classes of persons in the adoption decree. The decree must
state "as a minimum the following information: . . . whether
the petitioner or petitioners are husband and wife, stepparent
or a single parent .... "I'
One plausible reading of this provision is that a lesbian
nonbirth parent cannot adopt because the child would then
have two single parents. More specifically, it is possible that
"[the nonbirth parent] is not or would not be, if the adoption
were granted, a single parent, since the [child] already has a
parent."61 However, it is also plausible that the "single parent"
language refers not to the child's status to its parents, but
rather, refers to the marital status of the petitioner.62 Again, a
lesbian nonbirth parent is a single person and could be so iden-
tified in the adoption decree. Additionally, the language of the
59. Id. at 249-50, 522 P.2d at 1189; see also Report of Guardian ad Litem, supra
note 20 (suggesting that the adoption decree continues to refer to classes of persons
adopting).
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.250 (1)(c)(1989) (emphasis added).
61. Report of Guardian ad Litem, supra note 20, at 6 (emphasis added).
62. Trial Brief, supra note 53 at 6; Amicus Memorandum of Points and
Authorities: Whether Washington State Law Permits Same Gender Adoptions, by
Northwest Women's Law Center at 6, In re the Interest of E.B.G., No. 85-5-00137-5
(Thurston County Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1989) [hereinafter Amicus Memorandum].
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provision states that, "as a minimum," the information must
be provided. The "as a minimum" language suggests that a
nonbirth parent could be identified as a second parent without
contravening the statutory language.
Finally, the Singer court also looked to other statutes deal-
ing with marital issues, such as the community property stat-
ute, and noted that the language of these provisions still
referred to "husband and wife." Thus, "the legislature did not
contemplate that sexual equality included provision for same-
sex marriage."63
In comparison, other Washington statutes dealing with
children and parents clearly show that the legislature did not
intend to define the nature of families. For example, in the
Uniform Parentage Act, the legislature specifically provided
that the "[p]arent and child relationship extends equally to
every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital sta-
tus of the parents."' This provision suggests that a parent and
child relationship, created through adoption or any other legal
means, is a relationship between the adopting parent and the
child. Thus, the adopting parent's relationship with other
adults is irrelevant to her petition to adopt. The only time the
court need consider the petitioner's relationship to other adults
is when another adult joins in the petition or when the court
considers the best interest of the child.
2. Definition of Parent
In addition to identifying who may adopt, the adoption
statute also defines the term "parent." The statute defines
"parent" as "the natural or adoptive mother or father of a
child. ' 65 This phrase suggests, through the use of the disjunc-
tive "or," that a parent may be one of the following: an adop-
tive mother or a natural mother or an adoptive father or a
natural father.6
The critical term to be defined is "parent" not "parents."6 7
63. Singer, 11 Wash. App. at 250 n.3, 522 P.2d at 1189 n.3.
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.020 (1989).
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.020(8) (1989).
66. Masunaga v. Gapasin, 52 Wash. App. 61, 757 P.2d 550 (1988) (holding that the
term "or" is presumed to be used in the disjunctive unless indicated otherwise); see
also Judge's Report of Proceedings, In re the Interest of E.B.G., No. 87-5-00137-5
(Thurston County Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1989) [hereinafter Judge's Report].
67. If the statute sought to define "parents," the language could still be read in
such a way as to permit second parent adoptions. Grammatically, the phrase "the
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Only one of the possible definitions of a parent is intended to
apply to any one parent. Thus, when the court considers an
adoption where the family will be composed of two parents,
the definition does not on its face require that any particular
two of them are meant to be joined together. If the legislature
intended to limit the definition it probably would have defined
"parents" as "the natural or adoptive mother, but not both, and
the natural or adoptive father, but not both."
This interpretation of the definition of "parent" is espe-
cially plausible when one considers that some children have
two parents of the same sex through subsequent remarriage of
a parent and stepparent adoption.6" While the statute does not
specifically identify "stepparent" within the definition of "par-
ent," such adoptions are contemplated. 9 In fact, many chil-
dren are accustomed to having a stepmother and a natural
mother, or a stepfather and a natural father.70 Therefore, the
definition should be read to suggest that neither "natural" nor
"adoptive" mothers or fathers are exclusively permissible.
natural or adoptive mother or father of a child" could be interpreted in several
different ways. For example, it could mean: (a) mother of a child that is either
adoptive or natural, but not both; (b) mother of a child that is either adoptive or
natural, or both; (c) adoptive mother of a child or natural mother of a child, but not
both; or (d) adoptive mother of a child or natural mother of a child, or both. (father
may be substituted for mother in each interpretation). See Dickerson, The Difficult
Choice Between "And" and "Or," 46 A.B.A.J. 310, 312 (1960). If you tabulate the
phrase and infer the normal inclusive "or" you get this: Mother that is: (1) adoptive;
(2) natural; or (3) both. See id.
Expression (b) is the normally preferred grammatical reading, regardless of
whether the language is mandatory or permissive. Expression (d), which appears to be
different, is substantively the same as expression (b) because it is usually inferred that,
if you may or must have a mother that is either adoptive or natural or both, you may
also have both an adoptive mother and a natural mother. Therefore, a child could
have both an adoptive mother and a natural mother or an adoptive father and a
natural father. Id.
68. Although these children may have two parents, one psychological or biological,
and one legal, a stepparent adoption does terminate the noncustodial parent's legal
rights and responsibilities. See generally In re Gargan, 21 Wash. App. 423, 587 P.2d 545
(1981).
69. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.150(4) (1989).
70. Judge's Report, supra note 66, at 5-6. The Judge stated:
We have many children who, during the course of their lifetimes between
their conception and the age of 14, go through a natural father, a stepfather,
or conversely, a natural mother, maybe a stepmother, and maybe an adoptive
mother, all which may continue to exist or existed at one time or other during
the course of this child before they reach [the] . . .age of majority .... It is
not easy for them to distinguish all of these relationships sometimes, but it
certainly has never been argued that the fact that there may be multiple
parental relationships as to one child, would not prohibit adoption.
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3. Termination of Parental Rights
When a third party seeking to be legally identified as a
parent petitions the court to adopt, the adoption terminates the
natural parent's rights and responsibilities toward the child.7'
However, the language of the Revised Code of Washington,
section 26.33, does not require this termination: "The entry of
a decree of adoption divests any parent or alleged father who is
not married to the adoptive parent or who has not joined in the
petition for adoption of all legal rights and obligations in
respect to the adoptee, except past-due child support obliga-
tions. '7 2 This provision does not limit those who may join in
the petition for adoption.
To avoid having the natural parent's rights terminated in a
second parent adoption proceeding, the natural parent must
"join in the petition" for adoption.73 As in a stepparent adop-
tion, joining in the petition for adoption does not mean that the
natural parent is also petitioning to adopt.74 Joinder is simply
a procedure whereby the natural parent consents to the adop-
tion and the court recognizes that her rights are not
terminated.
Furthermore, the court has discretion to terminate a legal
parent and child relationship in any adoption case.75 Normally,
these termination provisions are used in traditional voluntary/
involuntary relinquishment situations or stepparent adoption
situations. However, since the stautory language is discretion-
ary, the court would not be required to terminate the natural
parent's rights and responsibilities in a second parent adoption.
The second parent adoption process would work the same as
the stepparent adoption process. The only difference is that
the two parents are not legally married in the second parent
adoption proceeding.
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.260 (1989).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.150(4) (1989) ("[Ilf the petitioner is married, the
petitioner's spouse shall join in the petition." (emphasis added)).
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.150(1) and (4) (1989).
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.130(1) (1989) ("If the court determines [that
termination is necessary] ... the court shall enter an appropriate order terminating a
parent-child relationship.").
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.130(3) (1989) provides: "The parent-child relationship
may be terminated with respect to one parent without affecting the parent-child
relationship between the child and the other parent."
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4. Strict Interpretation
Even though the provisions referring to termination of
parental rights seem to contain discretionary language, adop-
tion statutes must be strictly construed because they do not
derive from the common law.7 6 Therefore, opponents suggest
that second parent adoptions are impermissible because the
legislature did not specifically authorize or permit adoptions by
lesbian nonbirth parents.7 7
At first glance, the opponents' argument is persuasive;
however, it disregards the caselaw and established principles of
statutory interpretation. Washington courts have wavered
from strict interpretation when the resulting construction con-
flicts with the statute's purpose. In such instances, the courts
have looked at the adoption statute as a whole, not as isolated
parts.78 In interpreting any statute with ambiguous language,
the courts determine and give effect to the intent of the
legislature.7 9
The argument that second parent adoptions are not per-
missible because the legislature did not specifically authorize
them is also unpersuasive since the legislature, in 1984,
removed statutory classifications based on marital status and
all other factors except age and competency. The change was
presumably intended to provide stable homes for children and
insure the best interests of the child.8 0 It is equally likely that
the legislature did not specifically exclude second parent adop-
tions because it "did not intend to disqualify any prospective
adoptive parent based on gender or sexual [orientation].""1
Both opponents and proponents of second parent adoption
76. In re Santore, 28 Wash. App. 319, 326, 623 P.2d 702, 707 (1981).
77. Report of Guardian ad Litem, supra note 20, at 5.
78. See, e.g., In re Santore 28 Wash. App. at 327, 623 P.2d at 707 (citing In re
Adoption of Hickey, 18 Wash. App. 259, 261, 567 P.2d 260, 261 (1977); Gebhardt v.
Warren, 399 Ill. 196, 203-04, 77 N.E.2d 187, 191 (1948); and In re McFarland, 223 Mo.
App. 826, 830, 12 S.W.2d 523, 525 (1928)).
Although adoption statutes being in derogation of the common law, should be
strictly construed they should not be given a construction so narrow and
technical as to defeat their manifest intent and beneficial aims.... There
need not be strict compliance with each and every provision of the adoption
statutes even though such provisions may be couched in mandatory language.
In re Santore, 28 Wash. App. at 326-7, 623 P.2d 707.
79. In re Lehman, 93 Wash. 2d 25, 27 604 P.2d 948, 949 (1980); State v. Douty, 20
Wash. App. 608, 614, 581 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 92 Wash. 2d
930, 603 P.2d 373 (1979).
80. Amicus Memorandum, supra note 62, at 4-5.
81. Id. at 6.
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are correct in asserting that there is no legislative history
reflecting the legislature's position on this issue. Revision
Comments from the 1984 session merely reflect the legisla-
ture's intent to make the "best interests of the child" the fore-
most consideration in any adoption proceeding.82
Because the legislature may not have contemplated this
type of adoption when it made the 1984 revisions, critics might
also argue that it has not yet addressed the issue of second par-
ent adoptions. Realistically, it is not possible for legislators to
consider every possible factual situation which might fall
within the purview of the statute they enact. Recognizing this,
the trial court judge in In re the Interest of E.B.G. determined
that if the factual situation falls within the purview of the lan-
guage, even though it may not have been contemplated specifi-
cally by the legislature, and there is no language prohibiting
the situation, then there is no reason to preclude the adop-
tion. 3 Thus, the legislation should be interpreted in light of
all of the conceivable factual situations that may occur.
Furthermore, even under strict construction, the statute
can be interpreted as being broadly permissive of many differ-
ent factual situations.84 A narrowly structured statute, as
opposed to a broadly permissive statute, would identify cate-
gorical limits relating to factors such as ethnic backgrounds,
criminal histories, whether two sisters could adopt a child, or
whether there was an upper age limit for an adoptive parent.85
A narrowly structured statute would also indicate that a court
does not have discretionary power to grant an adoption except
within the categorical limits. A narrowly structured statute
would then negate the legislature's intent that courts deter-
mine what is in the best interest of the child. The Washington
adoption statute simply does not pose any categorical limits
except minimum age and competency.8 6
Finally, other states' courts have interpreted adoption stat-
utes, some of which have even more specific criteria than
Washington's age and competency criteria,87 as permissive of
second parent adoptions. None of the statutes in the states
that have granted second parent adoptions explicitly provide
82. See ADOPTION REFORM, supra note 45, at 1.
83. Judge's Report, supra note 66, at 4-5.
84. Id. at 5.
85. Trial Brief, supra note 53, at 4.
86. Id. at 7.
87. See cases and statutes cited supra notes 28, 51.
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that homosexuals may adopt.88 The states which find it neces-
sary to limit adoptions to heterosexual individuals have explic-
itly excluded homosexuals from the adoption process.8 9 In
Washington and in the other states granting second parent
adoptions, the criteria for determining whether to permit the
adoption is the "best interests of the child" standard.9 0
C. Second Parent Adoptions Are in the Child's Best Interests
The Washington State Legislature has specifically given
courts the power to grant an adoption if they determine that it
is in the child's best interests.9' Thus, Washington has embod-
ied in its statutes and caselaw the notion that in each decision
governing the adoption of a child the "best interests of the
child" remains the paramount goal.92 The "best interests of
88. Id.
89. For example, New Hampshire has limited adoptions to heterosexual persons:
Specifically as follows, any individual not a minor and not a homosexual may
adopt:
I. Husband and wife together.
II. An unmarried adult.
III. The unmarried father or mother of the individual to be adopted.
IV. Any foster parent.
V. A married individual without the other spouse joining as a
petitioner, if the individual to be adopted is not his spouse; and if
(a) The other spouse is a parent of the individual to be adopted and
consents to the adoption;
(b) The petitioner and the other spouse are legally separated; or
(c) The failure of the other spouse to join in the petition is excused
by the court by reason of prolonged unexplained absence, unavailability, or
circumstances constituting an unreasonable withholding of consent.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1988).
The general court has chosen over the years to enact statutes relative to
adopting children and providing foster care in order to further the best inter-
ests of our state's children. These statutory enactments of the state do not
involve intrusion into the private lives of consenting adults, but rather further
the public and governmental interest in providing . . .for children .... The
general court finds that, as a matter of public policy, the provision of a
healthy environment and a role model for our children should exclude homo-
sexuals.... Additionally, the general court finds that being a child in such
[adoption] programs is difficult enough without the added social and psycho-
logical complexities that a homosexual lifestyle could produce.
Id. (legislative intent accompanying statute).
90. See cases and statutes cited supra note 28.
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.010 (1989); see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
92. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.010 (1989). This section provides the following:
The legislature finds that the purpose of adoption is to provide stable homes
for children. Adoptions should be handled efficiently, but the rights of all
parties must be protected. The guiding principle must be determining what
is in the best interest of the child. It is the intent of the legislature that this
chapter be used only as a means for placing children in adoptive homes and
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the child" standard considers economic, psychological, and
social factors.9 3 Essentially, the test requires the court to con-
sider these factors, and determine how each may be furthered
given the particular circumstances.94
There is an increasing diversity of the types of families
that can meet the goal of the "best interests of the child" stan-
dard. For example, families contributing to the diversity
include single parent families, custodial and stepparent fami-
lies, foster families, heterosexual and homosexual non-marital
families,95 families created through artificial insemination, and
families created by adoption. These family structures are not
exclusive of each other; rather, the origins of a particular
existing family may derive from a previous family structure.
Furthermore, there is an increasing diversity in the range
of parenting roles. Parenting roles are no longer confined to
traditional mother/father images.96 Fathers may "mother" and
mothers may "father." Fathers may be custodial parents and
mothers may be granted visitation rights. Two people of the
same sex may also be parents to the same child through
divorce and remarriage. Thus, some children often have two
fathers or two mothers: one step, the other biological.97
Throughout the variety of family structures, there remains
a central theme-the "best interests of the child." Therefore,
the challenge to each adult participant is to make sure children
live in an atmosphere in which their best interests can be met.
not as a means for parents to avoid responsibility for their children unless the
department, an agency, or a prospective adoptive parent is willing to assume
the responsibility for the child.
Id. (emphasis added).
93. Comment, supra note 41, at 759.
94. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.004(3) (1989); statute cited infra note 104
(laying out statutory definition of basic parenting functions).
95. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 211-12, 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54, 544
N.Y.S. 2d 784, 788-89 (Ct. App. 1989). The Braschi court, holding that a homosexual
couple may qualify as a "family" within the meaning of rent control laws, stated:
a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two
adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long-term and characterized by
an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence. This view
comports both with our society's traditional concept of 'family' and with the
expectations of individuals who live in such nuclear units.
96. See D. EHRENSOFT, PARENTING TOGETHER: MEN AND WOMEN SHARING THE
CARE OF THEIR CHILDREN (1987).
97. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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1. Psychosocial Health of Lesbians
The process of recognizing that the best interests of a child
can be met in a second parent adoption begins by acknowledg-
ing the psychosocial health of homosexuals as individuals.9"
The American academic community has made great strides in
the acceptance of homosexuality. The American Psychiatric
Association, The American Psychological Association, The
National Association of Social Workers, and the American
Public Health Association have all issued statements affirming
that homosexuality is not a mental illness or a deviant form of
behavior.9 Researchers Kirkpatrick and Morgan note that
homosexual adults can function effectively sexually and
socially, and are not any more distraught than their heterosex-
ual counterparts. l00 Unfortunately, regardless of the strides
made by the organizations which acknowledge the overall
psychosocial well-being of homosexuals, a heterosexist attitude
still prevails in this society.101
Despite this prevailing heterosexist attitude, however,
some courts have made great strides in recognizing that homo-
sexuals are not "unfit per se" to parent and that their sexual
orientation is only one factor to consider in determining the
best interests of a child.0 2 The following section discusses how
98. Zuckerman, supra note 4, at 751.
99. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, D.S.M. III: DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 281-82, 380 (3d ed. 1980); AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 1984 Rules of Council, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 4 (1985);
see also Zuckerman, supra note 4, at 749 n.116 (citing Hitchens, Martin, and Morgan,
Child Custody and the Homosexual Parent, JUDGES' J., 33, 34 n.1. (Fall 1979)).
100. Kirkpatrick and Morgan, Psychodynamic Psychotherapy of Female
Homosexuality, in J. MARMOR, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: A MODERN REAPRAISAL 357,
362 (1980).
101. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979). Homophobia is the term
more commonly used to to describe the obsessive or irrational fear of homosexuals;
however, linguistically, it is incorrect. Herek, The Social Psychology of Homophobia:
Toward a Practical Theory, 14 REV. L. AND SOC. CHANGE 923, 925 (1986). The term
"heterosexism" more appropriately describes the condition labeled as homophobia. Id.
Heterosexism is characterized as:
[R]ather than an intense, irrational fear response that "phobia" denotes, what
homophobics really manifest is a value system that esteems heterosexuality.
Heterosexism assumes that heterosexual relationships are the only
appropriate way to manifest love and sexuality. All that is not heterosexual
does not exist. Heterosexism tries to wish away homosexuals.
Id.
102. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
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progressive some courts have become in the area of homosexu-
ality and parenting.
2. Lesbians as Parents
Through their examination of child custody issues, courts
have recently considered whether a child's best interests can or
cannot be met by lesbian parents. Custody cases allow broad
judicial discretion and some judges have exercised that discre-
tion to find a homosexual parent "unfit per se."' ' However,
many judges have moved beyond the sexual orientation of par-
ents to an evaluation of a parent's function," 4 and have con-
cluded that an individual's sexual orientation is not
determinative of his or her ability to be a good parent.
In 1983, the Washington Supreme Court, in In re Marriage
of Cabalquinto, found that homosexuality was not, in and of
itself, a bar to custody or visitation rights.105 Cabalquinto made
explicit what the Washington Supreme Court had previously
held in Schuster, namely:
[H]omosexuality in and of itself is not a bar to custody or to
reasonable rights of visitation .... Visitation rights must be
determined with reference to the needs of the child rather
103. Patt, supra note 4, at 110 n.91 (citing Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 119
Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); In re Jane
B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S. 2d 848 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); Newsome v. Newsome, 42
N.C. App. 415, 256 S.E.2d 849 (1979)). But see Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691
(1985) (homosexuals are unfit and improper custodians as a matter of law).
104. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. But see WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.09.004(3) (1989):
"Parenting functions" means those aspects of the parent-child relationship in
which the parent makes decisions and performs functions necessary for the
care and growth of the child. Parenting functions include:
(a) Maintaining a loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship
with the child;
(b) Attending to the daily needs of the child such as feeding, clothing,
physical care and grooming, supervision, health care and day care, and
engaging in other activities which are appropriate to the developmental level
of the child and that are within the social and economic circumstances of the
particular family;
(c) Attending to adequate education for the child, including remedial or
other education essential to the best interest of the child;
(d) Assisting the child in developing and maintaining appropriate
interpersonal relationships;
(e) Exercising appropriate judgment regarding the child's welfare,
consistent with the child's developmental level and the family's social and
economic circumstances;
(f) Providing for the financial support of the child.
105. In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 100 Wash. 2d 325, 669 P.2d 886 (1983).
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than the sexual preferences of the parent. The best interests
of the child remain paramount.
10 6
This holding parallels the movement in other states. For
example, as far back as 1967, a California superior court struck
down a presumption of "unfitness per se."'1 7 The court held
that a parent's sexual orientation is only one factor to consider
in determining the best interests of the child.10 8  More
recently, in Massachusetts and Indiana, courts have deter-
mined that the state cannot restrict visitation rights merely
because a parent's lifestyle is not within the "societal
mainstream."'0 9
Studies have consistently supported what these more pro-
gressive courts are now beginning to recognize: the similarities
between children raised by heterosexual parents and children
raised by lesbian parents far outweigh the differences." 0 Fur-
thermore, these courts also recognize the importance of a par-
ent in a child's life regardless of the parent's sexual orientation
or biological relation to the child."'
Although courts have begun to acknowledge the need to
avoid separating children from their homosexual parents, they
must also weigh other factors in any custody or second parent
adoption proceeding. Important factors for the court to con-
106. Id. at 329, 669 P.2d at 888 (upholding Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wash. 2d 626,
585 P.2d 130 (1978)). The Cabalquinto majority noted that the trial judge may have
abused his discretion in ruling that a gay parent could not have visitation privileges;
however, the dissent reproached the trial court's handling of the case by
acknowledging that the trial judge's "antipathy to homosexual living arrangements"
was indeed the basis for his opinion and, as such, amounted to an abuse of judicial
discretion. Id. at 331, 669 P.2d at 888 (Stafford, J., dissenting); see also Stroman v.
Williams, 291 S. C. 376, 379, 353 S.E.2d 704, 707 (1987) (citing Cabalquinto). The
concurring opinion affirmed the notion that judges are not in the business of
"gratuitously judging the private lives of other people." Id. at 381, 353 S.E.2d at 707.
107. See Nadler v. California Super. Ct., 255 Cal. App. 2d 523, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352
(1967).
108. Id. at 524, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
109. Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 410 N.E. 2d 1207 (1980); D.H. v. J.H., 418
N.E. 2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
110. See Green, Mandel, Hotvedt, Gray & Smith, Lesbian Mothers and Their
Children: A Comparison With Solo-Parent Heterosexual Mothers and Their Children,
15 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 2:167 (1986) [hereinafter Comparison]; Green, The Best
Interests of the Child With a Lesbian Mother, 10 BULL. OF THE AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 1, 14 (1982) [hereinafter Lesbian Mother]; Golombok, Spencer, Rutter, Children
in Lesbian and Single-Parent Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24
J. CHILD. PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 4:551 (1983).
111. See supra notes 2, 105-10 and accompanying text.
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sider are the effects of social stigma and any potential impacts
on a child's psychosexual development.
a. Social Stigma
Discrimination toward individuals who do not conform
with mainstream society is a serious problem in this country."1 2
Thus, we should not ignore any teasing and abuse a child
might experience from peers because he or she lives in a les-
bian household. However, society should not combat this
lower form of social behavior by separating unique individuals
from the mainstream. Fortunately, such segregation has not
been this country's recent practice."13
For example, in 1984, the United States Supreme Court
overruled a lower court decision to remove a child from the
custody of a parent who had previously been awarded custody
rights."14 The Court held that a Caucasian mother's custody
rights could not be terminated simply because she remarried a
Black man and her Caucasian child, from a previous marriage,
would now be stigmatized by having a Black father. The Court
stated that racial prejudice and classifications cannot justify
removing a child from the custody of a natural parent."15 Spe-
cifically, a unanimous Supreme Court stated:
The question, however, is whether the reality of private
biases and the possible injury they might inflict are permissi-
ble considerations for removal of an infant child from the
custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty con-
cluding they are not. The Constitution cannot control such
prejudices, but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot
directly or indirectly give them effect. "Public officials
sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a constitu-
112. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (it is indisputable that "homosexuals
have historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility"); High Tech
Gays v. Defense Industrial Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(invalidating Defense Department practice of subjecting gay security clearance
applicants to more exacting scrutiny than heterosexual applicants noting that "lesbians
and gays have been the object of some of the deepest prejudice and hatred in
American society").
113. Even the court in Singer v. Hara acknowledges, indirectly, that homosexuals
have been subjected to prejudice: "We are not unmindful of the fact that public
attitude toward homosexuals is undergoing substantial, albeit gradual, change." 11
Wash. App. at 262 n.12, 522 P.2d at 1196 n.12.
114. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
115. Id. at 434.
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tional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of racial
prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply
held.","
16
This analysis, as applied to racial differences, can be
extended to parental sexual orientation differences." 7 It nec-
essarily follows that if judges allow prejudice to enter into the
second parent adoption decision-making process, then their
decisions will serve only to perpetuate misconceived notions
about the lesbian community. 118 Therefore, while discrimina-
tion should not be ignored, neither should it be the basis of a
custody or adoption decision." 9
b. Psychosexual Development
In addition to problems arising from social stigma, oppo-
nents of adoption by homosexuals have expressed concern over
the psychosexual development of the children. To cite one
example, in 1987 the New Hampshire Supreme Court opined,
at the request of the state legislature, that the legislature could
constitutionally exclude homosexuals from the adoption stat-
ute because homosexuals are not fit to adopt or foster par-
ent. 2 ° The New Hampshire Supreme Court's finding of
unfitness reflected a concern that if homosexuals are permit-
ted to adopt or foster parent then the children will be more
likely to become homosexual.
121
The New Hampshire Court's concern, however, is not well
supported by scientific research. Although most researchers
116. Id. (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260-61 (1971) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
117. In the abstract, the analysis is the same; however, the United States Supreme
Court has yet to decide whether homosexuals are a suspect class, like Black
Americans, and are therefore entitled to equivalent "equal protection" under the
fourteenth amendment.
118. Rivera, supra note 101, at 947-48.
119. With respect to custody, see S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985)
(holding that "it is impermissible to rely on any real or imagined social stigma
attaching to Mother's status as lesbian"); M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 438, 404 A.2d
1256, 1263 (1979) (community intolerance may cause children to "emerge better
equipped to search out their own standards of right and wrong"). But see Thigpen v.
Carpenter, 21 Ark. App. 194, 199, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (1987) ("it was contrary to the
court's sense of morality to expose the children to a homosexual lifestyle"); Roe v.
Roe, 228 Va. 722, 728, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985) ("the conditions under which this child
must live daily . . . impose an intolerable burden upon her by reason of the social
condemnation attached to them, which will inevitably afflict her relationships with her
peers and with the community at large").
120. Opinion of the Justices, 129 N.H. 290, 525 A.2d 1095 (1987).
121. Id. at 296. 525 A.2d 1099.
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believe genetic, as well as environmental, factors play a part in
psychosexual development, 122 they have not exclusively identi-
fied any specific genetic or environmental factor as the single
source for sexual orientation development. 12 3
In studies of lesbian mothers and their children, social
scientists have determined that the incidence of homosexuality
or bisexuality in children is no greater than the incidence in
the population at large.'2 4 In fact, child development experts
lack the necessary evidence to suggest that parenting by homo-
sexuals will cause children to have a homosexual orienta-
tion.125  Experts have determined that children of lesbian
mothers show no differences in their gender identity, sex role
behavior, or sexual orientation than children of heterosexual
mothers.'2 6 This determination makes sense in light of the
widely-held opinion that sexual orientation is developed by the
age of five years. 2
7
While social scientists do not find a difference between les-
122. Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened
Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 818 n.137
(1984).
123. Id. The New Hampshire Supreme Court did note that the source of sexual
orientation is still not well understood. Opinion of the Justices, 129 N.H. 296, 525 A.2d
at 1099 (citing Suseoff, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or
Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 883 n.194 (1985)
[hereinafter Children's Best Interests]). However, the court found that "[g]iven the
reasonable possibility of environmental influences, . . . the legislature can rationally
act on the theory that a role model can influence the child's developing sexual
identity." Id.
Ironically, the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied in its argument on an article
which argues in favor of parenting rights for homosexuals. In that article, the author,
Suseoff, draws a different and seemingly more reasonable conclusion from the
research: "everything on the subject has revealed that the incidence of same-sex
orientation among the children of gays and lesbians occurs randomly and in the same
proportion as it does among children in the general population; as they grow up,
children adopt sexual orientations independently from their parents." Children's Best
Interests, supra, at 882.
124. Golombok, supra note 110, at 568; Comparison, supra note 110, at 180. See
generally Harris, Turner, Gay and Lesbian Parents, 12 HOMOSEXUALITY 2:101(1985).
125. Id.
126. Comparison, supra note 110, at 9; see also Lesbian Mother, supra note 110, at
188.
127. Note, supra note 122, at 818 n.137 (the author cites ten cases, articles, and
studies affirming this point including the following: Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121,
1132 n.19 (N.D. Tx. 1982) (court found credible expert psychiatric testimony that
sexual preference is probably fixed before age six); Ancafora v. Board of Educ., 359 F.
Supp. 843, 848-49 (D. Md. 1973) (court found sexual orientation is largely settled by age
five or six), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
836 (1974); J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY & GIRL 235 (1972) (factors
of sexual orientation probably determined before birth and established in late infancy
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bian parents and heterosexual parents and their parenting
capabilities, some courts have been slow to acknowledge the
research. 28 If they are to overcome their heterosexist attitude,
these courts must recognize what social scientists have come to
understand. Once they accept the research findings, the only
factor for them to consider in any adoption, by any adult, is the
same for all persons seeking to adopt: the child's best
interests.
II. CONCLUSION
Lesbians as well as heterosexuals can provide the environ-
ment and elements necessary for a child's best interests, and
for a child's healthy psychosocial/psychosexual development.
129
Heterosexuals do not have a monopoly on good parenting
skills. In fact, the Washington definition of basic parenting
functions does not identify sexual orientation as a factor in
determining whether an individual can perform parenting
duties.131 Children who have lesbian parents, however, are
sometimes denied the rights given to children of heterosexual
marital families.
For example, a recent tragic situation occurred because a
lesbian couple did not petition a Florida court to allow the
nonbirth parent to adopt her child before the natural parent
died.13 In this case the two women lived together in a monog-
amous relationship for thirteen years. The child was eight
years old when her natural mother died. This child's maternal
grandparents were awarded custody and the nonbirth parent
was given "reasonable visitation" privileges of one day per
month. Later, the grandparents were permitted to adopt the
child. The grandparents then sent the child to live with her
aunt because they were 70 years old and had health problems.
Court battles ensued, and five and one half years later an
appellate court set aside the adoption by the grandparents.
The court determined that the nonbirth parent's sexual orien-
tation did not have any detrimental effect on the child and that
the child's best interests would be served by reuniting her with
and early childhood); M. SAGHIR & E. ROBINS, MALE & FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY 319
(1973) (homosexuality determined early in childhood).
128. See Opinion of the Justices, 129 N.H. 290, 525 A.2d 1095 (1987).
129. See generally sources cited supra note 110.
130. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.004(3) (1989).
131. In re Pearlman, No. 87-24926 DA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Broward County Mar. 31,
1989) (as cited in 15 F.L.R. 1355 (5-30-89)).
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the nonbirth mother.132
In Washington, an unnecessary separation of a family
could be prevented through a second parent adoption and, all
other "best interests" factors being equal, such an adoption
would not contravene the adoption statute or the legislative
intent of providing for the best interests of the child. A child
with two parents, one natural and the other nonbirth, can have
her best interests served by allowing the nonbirth parent to
adopt the child she has coparented since birth, and the Wash-
ington courts have the authority to grant these types of
adoptions.
Carrie Bashaw
132. The court in In re Pearlman, No. 87-24926 DA, indicated that there are few
cases nationwide that involve custody disputes between lesbian or homosexual
partners; however, there is precedent for making an award of custody to the nonbirth
parent. Id. (citing In re Hatzopoulos, 4 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 2075 (Denver County Juv.
Ct. Nov. 15, 1977) (after the biolological mother's death and an interim custody award
to a relative of the biological mother, her lesbian partner was awarded custody of the
seven-year-old daughter born during their thirteen-year relationship); In re Matter of
B.T.B., No. 13475 (San Diego Super. Ct.) (a deceased father's homosexual partner was
awarded guardianship and custody of a 16 year old boy as against the child's biological
mother); No. CF-027204 (Los Angeles Super. Ct.) (a nonbirth mother has standing to
seek joint custody of a child when the two womens' relationship breaks up); In re L.O.
and E.W. (Lane County, Oregon 1988); In re S.S.H. and G.L.M., No. 15-86-05039 & 56-
86-05040 (Lane County, Oregon July 15, 1986) (cases in which lesbian couples have
obtained orders awarding joint custody to the biological and nonbiological mothers).
